Xi Jinping purges his predecessor, CCP Leader Hu Jintao (2002 to 2012) from the CCP, Oct 22, 2022.

In the late 90’s I looked forward to Communist China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and had no objection to NZ creating a free trade agreement with them. I was very much in the camp that argued that opening up China to trade would, over time, ameliorate their Communist One Party rule because regressing to something like Maoism would destroy that trade and impoverish China, something that a succession of Chinese Communist leaders had already turned their backs on. The soft embrace of capitalist trading would at least restrain the Party: no more Tiananmen Squares.

I had no illusions that some Jeffersonian democracy would emerge, and I don’t think any of the WTO/FTA boosters thought that either. But something like the one-party states of the Arabian Gulf would be okay, or even something like state of South Korea circa 1970’s-80’s, as distasteful as that might be.

For a while it seemed to be trending that way. The CCP Premiers came and went in a regular, clockwork process that appeared to have put an end to the typical communist fate of a one-man cult-of-personality rule. The economy grew on the back of private sector companies that were allowed to start up and grow quite large, Alibaba being just one, from launch in 1999 to a $230 billion valuation by 2014. The flood of Chinese goods helped keep inflation in the West under control in the wake of the GFC, despite Western governments flooding their economies with money.

But it didn’t last. The rise to power of Xi Jinping in 2012, his ruthless oppression of anybody opposed to him inside the CCP, and then his overthrow of the cycle of transferring power that had lasted almost three decades, signaled a return to the bad old days. This has been reinforced by the suppression of competing sources of power outside the CCP, which has seen even billionaires like Alibaba founder Jake Ma, being forced to “retire”, lest they upset things with criticism.

But as David Goldman (aka “Spengler), economist, author, and long-time journalist and now Deputy Editor or the Asia Times, explains in the article, China as It Is, this was always going to happen – and not because of communism but because of 3000 years of history, including this rather surprising fact about language in the modern nation:

The Chinese government estimated in 2014 that only 70 percent of its people speak basic Mandarin but that only one out of ten Chinese citizens speak it fluently. Six major languages and 280 minor ones are still spoken. Variations among China’s languages aren’t minor. A Mandarin-speaker from Beijing and a Cantonese speaker from Guangzhou won’t understand a word the other is saying. The two languages are as different as French and Finnish.

I knew about the Catonese-Mandarin gap but I had no idea it was that wide, nor about the other languages.

As a result of this and other factors, Goldman explains that while the foundation of Western statehood is civil society, a society of citizens, that’s not how China evolved:

It is not an “organic” nation that arose out of common Sittlichkeit, Hegel’s term for the complex customs and traditions that condition society, but a top-down construct managed by an imperial bureaucracy and tax system.

China’s unique geographic conditions required from antiquity a centralized tax system to fund infrastructure and a centralized bureaucracy to administer it. It never persuaded the peoples it absorbed into the Chinese empire to speak a common language or to confess the same religion. Ethnicity has no role in Chinese statehood.

Orders flowed from the Emperor to the provincial governor, from the governor to the local Mandarin, and from the Mandarin to the head of an extended family working a farm; its political system resembled nested Chinese boxes. The notion of an individual opinion had no practical value: There was no popular assembly, no Senate, no forum in which conflicting views might be debated.

As a result it never developed any dialectical philosophies like that of the West which buttress our institutions – where dialogue between people, perhaps many people, is used to arrive at an agreement, about the truth of a matter and decisions. Instead the Chinese philosophies evolved to support their way of doing things:

Chinese philosophy focuses on acceptance, hierarchical loyalty, or adherence to authority, in its respective guises of Taoism, Confucianism, and Legalism. It instantiates Hegel’s contention that Vernunft (loosely, critical reason) depends on freedom. America’s founders spent generations governing their affairs through church assemblies, town meetings, and provincial legislators before they ventured to create a republic. The Chinese in their 5,000-year history never had such an opportunity.

Which is why one Chinese “government” (even that word seems out of place) after another resembled what we see in the CCP today. A massive, centralised, technocratic institution with an “Emperor” at the top under which the people prosper – but don’t get out of line. There is no need for this emperor to be revered by the people or even liked; he’s there to stop the whole thing falling apart, and that’s understood by both sides. The Chinese people are well aware of the other side of the coin that appears when their central governments have collapsed; civil war, poverty and even famine.

Goldman doesn’t like this system, he thinks it stifles creativity, and judging by what’s happened under Xi Jinping’s rule he’s correct.

But that doesn’t change 3000 years of culture and history, as Goldman explains bluntly:

Americans imagine that inside every Chinese person an American is struggling to get out. But China is different, so different that the categories of Western political science are meaningless. China will not change because we think it should, or because we want it to, or because we exhort the Chinese to embrace the benefits of democracy and free markets. If it changes, it will do so very slowly. We shall have to deal with China as it is, and has been for thousands of years. 

What he doesn’t mention is that it means we should also not hesitate to push back on China in all spheres – diplomatic, economic and military – under some delusion that they’ll behave better if we don’t. This is not due to communism (with Chinese characteristics or whatever) or Xi Jinping, or State Capitalism or any ideology. It is due to a culture deeply rooted in three millennia of lived experience, passed down the generations.

Read the whole thing.