What are the Requirements? Who are the Contenders?
An Opinion Editorial by Udea Station
A frigate is essentially a class of defensive vessel, which provides a protective screen for merchant ships plying their trade through our sea lanes and for our deployed naval support ships with embarked personnel, against a range of threats above, below and on the ocean. Their employment context is very different to a fast attack missile boat or an Arleigh Burke destroyer launching long-range Tomahawk missiles. Frigates are more of a guardian within our maritime domain and less an aggressor. So, if you get the opportunity to gently explain that to your neighbour Karen, please do so.
The Anzac replacement will likely be sourced from the current FVEY (Five Eyes) nations supplier base. There are capable Korean and Japanese options, but they won’t be any cheaper and may have some significant ITARS (International Traffic in Arms Regulartions), IP sharing, and integration hurdles which would need to be addressed. European frigates are also capable, however a directly sourced European Frigate often possesses combat and sensor systems which are European-centric and often are not as seamlessly integrated into the US-Australian maritime networked architecture which we have historically used. There are also questions about the level of sustainment support from EU defence suppliers. Furthermore, there is often no tangible advantage regarding acquisition costs compared to our traditional FVEY frigate suppliers.
Because of our long SLOC (Sea Lines of Communications), broad area of maritime interest and that the chosen platform will have a 35 year operational lifespan, it is important that room for capability growth in the platform is accounted for in terms of sensors, weapons and machinery. Therefore any future RNZN frigate will have to be comfortably over 5500 tonnes full load and possess long range and extended endurance characteristics suitable for Trans-Pacific operations. Furthermore, with the present crew restraints in operating a small Navy, each Frigate must sail with less than 150 embarked personnel and be highly automated. Neither the cheapest nor the most expensive options are the best. There is more to the cost-capability spectrum than meets the eye.
The Type 26
The Canadian variant is likely to be the most compelling of the Type 26 class in terms of its overall capability package for the RNZN. However, it is a whopping NZD$5.3 billion per hull. The RAN (Royal Australian Navy) variant is slightly cheaper and the RN (Royal Navy) variant, though the cheapest, is less capable than the other variants. Yet it is still too expensive for the capability it possesses.
There is a massive cost penalty to be paid in purchasing the Type 26 as all variants are part of a local naval shipbuilding programme, which is just as much about creating local industrial capacity and local jobs, as they are about their role as surface combatants. The Type 26 for the RNZN is basically dead on arrival because of its huge sticker price.
The Type 31
The Type 31 option referred to in a previous thread by Dr. Wayne Mapp, seems at first glance an acceptable solution. It is substantially cheaper than the Type 26. It is a design variant of the Danish Iver Huitfeld Class, which is an AW (Air Warfare) frigate evolved from the earlier Absalon Class flexible support ship. However, in its cut price RN configuration, the Type 31 has only an austere level of CMS (Combat Management System), sensor and weapons fit-out. It actually offers a capability slightly less than what the upgraded ANZAC Class will be. Its ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) abilities are, in my opinion, weak. I suspect that Wayne, based on the estimated final cost he provided, has cost-factored in all the likely additional capabilities per CMS, sensors and weapons that would be required so that it is able to conduct ASW, EW (Electronic Warfare) and AD (Air Defence) and actually be survivable as both a SLOC escort and submarine hunter, or being able to be tasked on independent operations at long range even within the periphery of the intensive maritime shatter zones that will be a feature of the Indo-Pacific post 2030. In its RN specification it only has an AD capability that would enable it to survive attacks as they would be expected in constabulary type operations.
I am not sure though if Wayne has included in his upgrade estimates the acoustic rafting of engine room machinery required for an ASW platform, where quietness is paramount. In my view the Type 31 is hindered by its diesel-only propulsion and the lack of an electric drive mode. The vessel will require further adaptation to include a towed array, which is a fundamental component that an ASW frigate must have. All these required must-haves will blow out the acquisition cost. The vessel would require a further design review to get it at a capability level we would require. The warning I give is that the so-called cheap Type 31 may not be so cheap in the end.
Any future Kiwi frigate will have to be extremely competent against a capability peer rival in the context of the Indo-Pacific. If New Zealand were in the Caribbean or South Atlantic where the Type 31 is likely to be deployed then fine. However, for a Type 31 to work in the context of the Indo-Pacific post 2030, it will need to be fully interoperable within the Air-Space-Maritime domain architecture of our close partners – principally Australia, the USN (US Navy), Canada and possibly the JMSDF (Japan). This means the essential inclusion of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Aegis Baseline 10 software, a very capable AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and a solid EW (Electronic Warfare) capability.
A Type 31 frigate will not do the job that we or our partners require a RNZN frigate to do, if it is going to have a level of capability that the Royal Navy is acquiring. To get it right for the kind of operations that it will be expected to be tasked on will require the virtual evolution of a new ship. It is possible to build such an evolved and improved vessel, but there will be delays and in my view there is in existence an ideal turnkey solution that offers a better way forward. The Type 31 and Type 26 programmes are not the only frigate options to focus on.
The Constellation Class
The only alternative left is the new USN FFG-62 or ‘Constellation Class’, based on the proven FREMM design. This vessel is the peer of the Type 26 in a combat capability sense, but at only slightly more money than what a Type 31 would end up costing following all the additional and complex changes required for it to be able to safely operate independently in the Indo-Pacific of post-2030. The USN’s proposed FY2022 budget requested US$1,087.9 million (NZD$1565m) for the procurement of the third FFG-62, which includes all the essential government furnished equipment (GFE). It is a true multi-role surface combatant, able to conduct the required spectrum of ASW, ASuW (Anti-Surface Warfare), EW and AD roles.
The USN was able to get costs down because they started with a set of tightly prescribed requirements to get the frigate fit-out configuration they required. They drew upon existing machinery, propulsion, combat and sensor systems that were already in hot production or within supply chains across the USN fleet. Another aspect the USN used in getting cost processes under control was by selecting a prime builder (Fincantieri Marinette Marine) who had an existing design (the FREMM) and a prime systems integrator (Lockheed Martin), who has a considerable supplier and product line depth to draw upon and at scale.
A future RNZN frigate programme could tack on to a planned USN production block order for the Constellation Class and thus be able to tap into the long lead-line bulk buyer advantages that the USN can achieve through their supplier pool depth and weight of purchasing scale across the build programme. New Zealand was able to take advantage of this kind of economies of scale recently with respect to the P-8A and C-130J acquisitions because of our FVEY privileges within the US DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) regime. There is also the potential for further cost savings as some items from the current Anzac Class (following a refresh or block upgrade) can be cross-decked over into a Kiwi Constellation Class as they are already pre-integrated into the vessels combat management systems software. For example the Phalanx 1B CIWS, the Mod-5 127mm main gun, the Sea Ceptor missiles and decoy systems.
The ‘keep it simple’ approach in going down the Constellation Class route is definitely worth serious consideration in what will be the biggest defence procurement project in NZ history. It is the most de-risked option in my view. The US support and sustainment chain is the gold standard (both the Brits and Europeans are pretty rubbish at that) and as a platform has been been conceived principally for Indo-Pacific operations. In terms of combat survivability it is better than the Type 31 as it is being built to full US Naval warship construction standards where as the Type 31 is planned to be built to Lloyds Register Naval Ship Rules. The Constellation Class will possess full interoperability with our close regional partners in terms of being able to tap into the full networked architecture of the air-maritime-space domain well as with other synergetic NZDF assets such as the P-8A, the WGS-9 (Wideband Global SATCOM system) and the likely Sea Sprite maritime helicopter replacement, the MH-60R.
Finally, the Washington DC welcome mat is much bigger for New Zealand, opportunity wise, than Number 10 Downing Street. If New Zealand were placing a Constellation Class order, it would be prudent to leverage FTA (Free Trade Agreement access with the US as a complementary MFAT initiative with negotiations running in parallel. Defence-Diplomacy-Intelligence-Trade are not silo’s in themselves, but interdependent with each other and it may well be the final puzzle that gets NZ the US FTA bi-lateral it has desired for the last 25 years. I have never been able to understand why that golden penny hadn’t dropped in Wellington much earlier. Washington, when the right buttons are pressed, looks more favourably upon trade access into their markets when security considerations utilising their defence export industries enter the FTA quantum.
As for numbers, three hulls are the absolute minimum number of Frigates the Kiwi Navy requires for the next 30 years – a fourth hull, though optimal, can be ordered later. Nevertheless, the RNZN must also have what is called a “Zero Ship”; in other words a land based frigate training centre that replicates onshore all functional competency tasks required thus allowing the 3-vessel frigate fleet to spend more time at sea conducting security operations.
This means far less sea-days devoted to onboard training and a shorter timeframe conducting pre-deployment work-ups. This means the generation of a 4th crew rotating through the ‘Zero Ship’ under training whilst the other frigates are deployed. Moreover, the plug and play nature of modern modular frigate designs and advanced shore maintenance management and sustainment support systems, also mean that 9 month long refits every 5 years can be greatly reduced getting the ship and crew out on the ocean with greater frequency. In many respects that ‘Zero Ship’ is the “Fourth Frigate” of the fleet.
My final word is that – all going well – it takes 6 years to build a frigate from the time an order is placed with the ship yard if it is a vessel currently in hot production, until it finally gets commissioned into a Naval service. If it is a first of type for a Navy to get to grips with, it can take further time for the crew to fully introduce the capability. This means that the incoming government in 2023 will have to make its decision within that three-year term to lock into a frigate build programme like the Constellation Class and have the first new vessel in the water before the first Anzac Class is decommissioned. We must not find ourselves again in the situation whereby we have a lengthy period of time when there was actually no frigate capability like what happened recently. The risk is too great considering the level of strategic uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific region from now on, which includes a push by a super power using ‘sharp power’ tactics right into our South Pacific neighborhood.
No Minister 
Fascinating, great piece. Your argument in favour of the US Constellation class is compelling. Should we proceed with Frigates that class looks a sensible decision.
Taking a devils advocate position. What is our RNZN mission? What should it be? Is Fisheries protection, Civil defence support, friendly nation interoperability and ASW sufficient?
Why not invest in more offshore patrol craft with greater role flexibility than a small number of vulnerable frigates that could not operate alone against any likely threat? We could spend the same overall budget on Offshore Patrol Vessels and get a greater number of hulls.
Ukraine has shown that the larger capital items are vulnerable. A man with MLAW can take out the largest Russian tanks and Stingers have made the Russian Airforce combat ineffective in Ukraine. Shore based Shore to Ship missiles took out a Russian ship. AS missiles mean that the US carriers will not be able to participate at close range in any Taiwan mission or anything.
Why not reduce the size and increase the firepower rather than go for the prestige of the biggest vessel, a frigate, that we can afford?
One of the worst decisions that the last government made was to reduce our frigate fleet from 4, to 2. The strain on the ships, coupled with the higher operational tempo a smaller fleet requires.
As to what the mission is, that will change over the lifetime of the ships, and the recent moves in the Solomons by China is giving a lie to the notion espoused by Helen Clark that we live in a benign strategic environment. Having operational compatibility with our largest allies is vital, and for that reason alone, an order for 4 Constellation Class ships would be a great signal, not only for the local mission, but also as a stragtegic statement.
If one looks at the globe with NZ at the center, you start to realise just how isolated we are, and patrol boats simply will not cut it. At a strategic level we need our navy to be able to carry out smaller local roles, but be ready to work with a larger allied fleet.
The decision to reduce from 4 to 2 was made by the Lange government in 1988. However, NZ was given the chance to buy a third frigate in 1998. Max Bradford (Minister of Defence) wanted to do so, but Deborah Morris said she would leave the coalition, thereby precipitating an early election. It was not possible to review that decision since the order book for ANZAC frigates closed in 2000.
That 3rd Frigate option came up a couple of times when Max Bradford was Minster and Gerald Hensley was the Defence Secretary.
The first option the Australians gave was 15% down to pay for long lead procurement to kick things off but we would not have had to start paying the remainder until after delivery in 2003 through to 2008.
The Australians tried again with a 2nd hand nearly new Anzac option which was believed to be the HMAS Arunta and Max Bradford was keen on putting down a $50 million non refundable deposit on it to lock it in and again with very favourable payment terms.
This time it was the Rev Ann Batten MP who put the mocker on it blabbing to Helen Clark who politically milked it for what it was worth. The rumour I heard was the deal was circa AUD$355m, which was basically the flatline build cost and that the RAN would built a further Anzac to replace it before the Williamstown shipyard ceased. The Australian government were very keen to keep the Anzac yard going for a couple of years longer – as on their side of the ditch it was also about jobs.
The Australians put $800m of supplier contracts into the NZ side of the Anzac project and we got two frigates for a cost of $1.2 billion.
Thanks for reading it.
Your devils advocate question has been well answered in recent Defence White Papers and the most recent Defence Assessments late last year.
Frigates versus OPV’s are not an either / or. You need both. And yes we do need more than two lower end vessels for constabulary work. However they have less range and too slow to sustain a SLOC escort vessel (now that Marsden Point is going good luck with the securing fuel supply security from now on if things go pear shaped not too mention other vital imports and exports). Furthermore they cannot be used to protect for example our large support vessels like the Canterbury or Aotearoa.
Multi-role Frigates like the Type 26 and FFG-62 are not especially vulnerable because they have considerable self-protection capabilities – especially so if they networked into the overarching air-space-maritime architecture of our partners.
Land domain operations in the context of the Ukraine do not relate to ConOps in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific. What of C4? What of tactics? What of counter-measures? All have considerable influence in shaping success within any domain.
To answer the question that went off into a tangent about anti-ship capabilities and carriers and nothing to do really directly with the topic. Probably a DF-21 saturation missile attack, which I assume you are suggesting is maybe of concern to a Carrier, but it needs terminal guidance to remain uninterrupted to hit the target. The SM-6 has been introduced to deal with it though through the Aegis CMS of the Arleigh Burkes that escort it. Are you also certain that the USN won’t have anything within the Carrier group that won’t have electromagnetic capabilities to create such disruption to the DF-21’s guidance? Besides the USN Virgina’s and JMSDF Taigei-class submarines will be lurking below and the B-21’s and B-2’s above – to slam back at their launch sites.
Steel is pretty much the cheap part of building a frigate. The expensive part is the systems inside of them, which include all the electronics, weapons, sensors, propulsion etc. You could build a frigate capability onto a smaller hull or what is called a Corvette and end up with a similar cost if it was as such outfitted. However they are green water short-ranged ships useful for work within the Med Sea or in the Gulf, but a waste of time in the blue water environment of the Pacific where we live and the range of sea keeping characteristics involved.
Thank you US for your contribution … although I’m ‘Brown’ I do have links with the ‘Dark Blue’ so I find your contribution fascinating. But again I raise the question whether there is the political will to invest $5b+ (in 2022 dollars) for three frigates plus the ‘zero’ ship add on. I’m not holding my breath.
For Phil S … be very clear … our two OPVs are not combat ships. They cost only $110m (each) and were built to a price and not to a standard you would associate with a combat ship. They are in effect Coastguard type vessels and do not incorporate the redundancies associated with warships.
Well Vet it is more likely a 10 billion dollar investment over the 35 year lifetime of the programme actually, the build costs are just the acquisition package, but do you really think that NZ will be in a position to say we want none of this. $10 billion over 30+ years is a fairly cheap price to pay to remain in what John Key called “The Club” as well as protecting our SLOC’s in the event that all sea trade routes into and out of NZ are disrupted, that we wont lose the Pacific or billions in trade.
As Wayne Mapp pointed out in another thread NZ would get quite a cold shoulder from Australia (if you think the 501 stuff is harsh, wait to you see what Canberra will really do – they already believe we disrespect the ANZAC relationship and don’t share enough of the burden on Defence – historically their Labor governments have been harsher critics than their Libs), plus the US, Japan, quite a few of the ASEAN nations would also be very very displeased.
New Zealand might claim an independent foreign policy but that only works or gets respected if it stays within the general lane of the likeminded liberal democratic states we work with and do business with. Get out of that lane for too long and our friends can deliver our wayward political will a bit of tough love.
Happily enough we do vote for actual adults every once and a while to make these kind of major critical decisions. With an election coming up next year I am more likely to support the party which has seven of its current line up with Defence Force backgrounds and two former Defence Ministers, than a party with a part time Defence Minister and no one else who has had any kind of defence, international relations or security chops.
Besides not doing Light Rail down Dominion Road or a Shinkansen Line to Hamilton will pay for our future Frigates anyway.
Either the Type 31 or the Constellation class would suit.
Defining the mission is essential. New Zealand does not need specialist ASW frigates. As Udea notes, such ships have many special requirements, which adds a great deal to the costs, at least $500 million or more per ship.
Both the Type 31 and the Constellation are really in the category of general purpose frigate, with patrol capability, small surface vessel interdiction, local air defence and some limited ASW capability. Unlike OPV’s (advanced OPV’s, not ones like the Otago or the Wellington) they can much more readily go into harms way. The choice of helicopter is critical.
The ANZAC frigates are essentially general purpose frigates. Both the Tye 31 and the Constellation class are about 25% larger than the ANZAC ships, with 5,000 tonnes seemingly being the minimum frigate size for new designs, as opposed to 3,500 tonnes for frigates designed three decades ago.
As The Veteran notes, the key issue now is the will to purchase replacement combat ships. Even 2 will cost at least $4 billion. But that can be afforded within a defence budget that is 1.5% of GDP, which is the current level. Not buying frigates will actually reduce the defence budget as a percentage of GDP.
I personally think we should go for 3 or 4. Three will require a defence budget of about 1.7% of GDP, 4 will require a lift in the budget to nearly 2% of GDP. Given how long it actually takes to get combat ships, the uplift in the budget won’t occur till toward the end of this decade.
Will the frigate replacement be an issue for this election?
I think it needs to be. The decision to purchase frigates has to occur in the parliamentary term 2023 to 2026, if the ships are to come on line by the mid 2030’s when the ANZAC’s will be over 35 years old.
The Greens will definitely be a “no”, maybe ACT will also be in that camp. That means the two major parties need to get off the fence. It may be that NZF might be the forcing point. They seem to have a credible chance of being elected in 2023, and could well hold the balance of power. Their actions from 2017 to 2020 have shown them to be a bit more staunch on defence than other political parties.
Why would ACT be a no? I haven’t seen them being soft on defence, they usually think we should do about what our major trading partners and allies do, no more, no less. So 2% of GDP would be within what they’d agree to.
Interesting contributions. Udea you have me convinced on the basic reality that it is the “extras” that cost the money. Looking at crew numbers there does not seem to be a great deal of difference when comparing a true up armed OPV per Wayne vs the existing cheap with minimal systems.
Wayne you have me convinced the only uncertainty is the will. Given Luxon is accustomed to big ticket capital decisions the prospect of that kind of commitment to US vendors should not be as difficult for the incumbents.
Would the Navy be able to keep 3 frigates and a zero platform manned, or would be it akin to the LAV in storage issue where the number of qualified ratings is insufficient for full usage? The more pressing question given how disrespected our defence obligations and treatment of service members have been under the current government is: How do people believe it is good for us a global member of society to stand by our alliances make the Armed Services a more attractive place to join.
No direct criticism Wayne but I find the defence reviews and assessments full of politically correct waffle that does not say very much in hard facts. Is there some way of reading them to make them more meaningful?
LOL kicking the tyres on fancy Frigates are we?
This country is bankrupt chums – we have lost 30% of our foreign exchange earnings, inflation is through the roof and things are not about to get better
Ask the Sri Lankans about collapsed economies
Where’s the money coming from to pay for your grandiose fantasies?
In a small way T agree with you but thanx to your nice Mr Putin, aided and abetted by the Chinese expansion into the South Pacific, maybe, but maybe, the dynamic many change as people wake up to the realisation that bullies only understand force and the threat of force.
And the biggest bully on the geopolitical playground would be….?
Now here’s the thing you personalize the biggest current crisis to Vladimir Putin who you have been conditioned to see as a comic book villain
And distracted by that childish narrative you miss the fact that we are in the midst of a World War
(1) There is the shooting war in the Donbas a long planned campaign involving proxy NATO forces created by the Neo cons to be used as cannon fodder in their grand scheme to achieve “Full Spectrum Dominance”. The Neo Cons of course have weaponized Ukraine to be used as a force to be against Russia
(2) Then there is the information war which in the West at least has been won by Washington – not so much outside the Five Eyes and Europe though. For most people in Asia, South and Central America and Africa they see Russia as standing up to the bully. And that is hardly surprising as most of them have been on the receiving end, one way or another of American and European coercive tactics (a polite way of saying bullying, both economic and military)
In any case those who bandy about phrases like “Russian Aggression” are generally blissfully unaware that a huge proxy NATO army that had gathered to launch an offensive in the Donbas and Russia, which is a lot more then Putin, moved to block that offensive and are now currently systematically dismantling that army
(3) And finally the most important theatre of all – the Economic sphere and in this theatre the West is probably in retreat
The problem is is that people like Joe Biden and Victoria Nuland have visceral hatred of Vladimir Putin and that clouds their judgement which means they have missed the fact that Europe needs Russia far more than Russia needs Europe. It also brings with it the great danger that they will miscalculate and set the whole world on fire
Andrei,
I get that you are a Russian nationalist and want to believe the best of Russia, but I find your continuing defence of the war extraordinary. Not even all Russians believe the war is justified. Tens of thousands have protested, which has much bigger consequences for protestors than for protestors in most of the West.
I know you are skeptical of the western press, you are not alone in that regard, so does Tom, to put it mildly.
But when experienced journalists from numerous outlets have video they have taken themselves, when they talk directly to the people, are we really expected to believe they all CIA (or MI6) agents or alternatively they are just ignorant dupes? That the Ukrainian government are neo-nazis perpetrating genocide in the Donbas. Putin has not even tried to present any evidence in support of that.
Apparently you live in NZ (I presume that is the case) and have done so for a number of years. Surely enough of our democracy has percolated through to you that you can’t surely think that New Zealand is some kind of fake democracy and that we don’t actually have a free press (the $50 million notwithstanding). Or do you think our democracy is no better than that of Russia and China and that people have no real freedom to have contrary views and able to express them?
Or more particularly in respect of the Ukrainian war, that the western press are utterly corrupt or alternatively utterly stupid.
The garbage of a true believer and we won’t even talk about war crimes … the bodies of civilians with their hands tied behind their backs or the taking out of the children’s shelter clearly marked.
Folks – meaning Andrei, Vet and Wayne.
Much as I appreciate the back-and-forth on Russia it belongs in a different post. At this point you could more appropriately copy and paste this stuff on my latest post about upcoming global food problems, since that is, at least, peripherally related to Russia and the invasion of Ukraine.
The purpose of this post is to discuss the future of the RNZN frigate programme.
The answer is to ignore Andrei. His views re Russian atrocities have no place in comments on this post. Thanks to Udea for an interesting column and a compelling analysis. Wayne: why do you doubt that ACT would be opposed? I’ve been involved in ACT at the electorate level over the years. I’ve never heard anything like that. Plainly NZ needs a navy and equally plainly it needs three frigates minimum.
I’m being clumsy above. Wayne: why do you think ACT would be opposed?
In question time just now David Seymour asked the PM if she will commit to increasing defence spending to 2% of GDP.
This says to me that that ACT may likely be happy to head in the general direction of increasing our defence spend towards 2%.
Of course the PM refused to make any such commitment.
Good to hear about David Seymour’s question. National needs to get on board.
I guess my view of Act dates back to an earlier period when (as I recall) they didn’t see much point in the defence force.
But I concede that was 25 years ago, and has influenced my overall view of Act. However, there is a whole new generation of MP’s who are not nearly as purist libertarian or doctrinaire.
Heh, heh, heh…..
… something you might also consider about your non-MP opponents. I may vote ACT in 2023 and I absolutely support Udea Station’s arguments here:
– 2% GDP spending on the NZ military
– The Constellation Class as the choice.
– Four such frigates, plus the “Zero Ship”
– Tie the deal into an argument for an FTA with the USA.
– Do all this in a National-led government post 2023 and unlike the F-16 deal, lock it in with contracts and down-payments of cash that prevent a future Green-Labour government pulling a Clark.
Udea’s got a post coming up on the Air Force. Looking forward to it.
Wayne/Udea/Tom/Vet I am curious to know your thoughts on the political benefits/implications of buying American Frigates. I had not previously given much thought to how kindly the American military industrial would look kindly on trade deals vis a vis a military purchase. As noted above the Aussies went out of there way to make the deal work for us. Is there an intellectual discussion that can be crafted to convince the key MP’s in an incoming government of the benefits of buying American. It also looks as though American prices and procurement are much more competitive than they were in comparison to last time around.
You should exclude me from this question because I don’t have the NZ military/political background (at high levels) to contribute.
But since you asked…:
our NZ population has been conditioned to pacifism so will support only enough spending for “peace-keeping”.
It’s really important for National and ACT to be elected into government. You want to screw that up?
Yeah. As I explained in my first ever post here, I comment on American matters because NZ is pretty much a lost cause across the board. On this specific matter, we’ll be content with the two upgraded ANZAC frigates and sometime in the late 2030’s they’ll have to be scrapped, after which it’s Coast Guard time baby.
and that TH adds another dimension to the political question regarding Will to do … there is a certain latent anti-American bias in NZL … more so with Labour and the Greens, less so with National and ACT, but I suspect you can easily find elements of that right across the political spectrum … bottom line, three frigates will be a fight; three American frigates might just be a bridge too far.
My instincts are that buying British will be a much easier political sell than buying American. We have a long history with the Royal Navy. The Australians and Canadians are buying British, admittedly the Type 26. But nevertheless that is a pointer. since there will be some common equipment with the Type 31 and the Type 26.
We have just renewed the key parts of the Airforce with American aircraft, they were the only practical choice.
Buying British also fits in with the idea of global Britain, in the same way that AUKUS does.
Three will be an easier proposition than four.
I don’t disagree Wayne. A British vessel is an easier political sell. That said the Constellation Class is a Italian FREMM design which has been built in the US by the Italian firm using US firms suppliers – under the direction of a prime integrator Lockheed Martin to US Naval Warship standards. So you could smudge it a little.
All of the Type 26 variants have a considerable amount of local content and US content, even the UK ship – quite a bit of it from Lockheed Martin. But that hull though is the secret to the Type 26 and its very high cost – which is basically the highest tier of ASW capability on a hull and the hull is almost a Destroyer in size.
As I understand it OMT a Danish naval architecture firm holds or once held – the originating licence for the Type 31 design which Babcocks UK are building the Type 31 from. Nevertheless, they are part of the team along with Harland and Wolfe who pitched the Type 31 design to the RN and are now pitching to the UK MoD the second tranche the five vessels dubbed the Type 32 which, will have a Littoral Warfare capability aspect to them based on the same hull.
If all of our FVEYS partners have current Frigate programmes in production and they all have suppliers under reasonably longterm lead-line contracts who are providing components in terms of radars, sensors, weapons systems. Tapping into all of those channels to get the best mix on a Kiwi variant of the Type 31, might be a project management challenge but could be a possibility.
I suppose a way forward is to investigate what improvements could be made to the Type 31 design through a engineering study undertaken with the Danish naval architectural firm to see what changes make it suitable for us in the context of the future Indo-Pacific operations. From that select it as the baseline hull, engage a prime integrator like LM to oversee the bringing together the mix of required systems, and then find a yard.
I note that Babcocks UK have just signed a MOU with Korean shipbuilding giant DSME.
Of note DMSE built the new RN RFA Tide Class AORs and the RN were less than impressed with the quality of the work. I have heard stories through the grapevine of pretty shoddy electrical wiring fittings etc. I were went to SK, we’d be best to go to HHI if we could because they built Aotearoa and did a good job. I’ve heard no complaints about her build.
WRT to frigates, the USN FFG-62 Constellation Class has a lot to offer but wouldn’t necessarily be the best acquisition for NZ. The USN FFG CONOPS (Concept Of Operations) are different to that of the RNZN and the RAN, and their crewing philosophy is different with them having far higher crew numbers. We might have to modify the ships to a degree which isn’t a major problem. What I have been considering is taking the Babcock / OMT Arrowhead 140 design and using most of the RCN CSC fit out on it including the SPY-7 radar and AEGIS, along with the LMC CMS330 which we already use. We wouldn’t use all of the RCN fit out because they have some specifically unique Canadian things and we would do some things differently. We would use Lockheed Martin as the integrator because they are also the integrator for the RCN CSC and they will be familiar with the integration plus AEGIS is their product.
What we could do is have the hulls built and the machinery installed overseas, shipped to NZ, with the fitout being done here, say at Whangarei. This way the government gets to claw back some of the acquisition costs through direct taxes (PAYE, GST etc.,) and indirect taxes from the increased economic activity. It would bring necessary work and employment to Northland and increase NZ’s resilience because with the addition of a drydock, we would be able to undertake maintenance, repairs, and upgrades of our ships here, instead of overseas.
Perhaps the type 26 (expensive hull) but sold as a political decision. Better ship, just expensive?
@PaulL
The Type 26 is a specialist ASW (Anti Submarine Warfare) frigate with AD (Air Defence) capabilities. What we really require is a GP (General Purpose) frigate that can cover a variety of roles including ASW, AD, ASuW (Anti Surface Warfare), and other capabilities. So it has to be modular and able to re-role quickly for roles other than those three main ones or reinforce a main role. Fortunately there are systems available to enable that. That’s why modern frigates have mission bays. Because we are small we have to be creative about how we spend our limited funds and look at alternatives to our traditional suppliers.
One has to wonder if the face of modern warfare has changed.
The entire Black Sea fleet, except submarines, are bottled up in port due to a few drones.
What use are frigates going to be, assuming we can find people to man them?
Supporting troop landings in the Solomons to oust Chinese invaders
Supporting US troops going ashore in China
Hunting Chinese subs
Being part of protecting convoys across the Pacific.
I thinks our frigates would be wiped out very quickly by drone technology launched off a sub.
I suspect if China steps out of line it will be flattened by a combination of Japanese, Indian and US forces, most of which in 20 years will be super drones.
Would we not be better building up our airforce / drone capabilities for anti-submarine warfare.?
Surely we should be building up our ass-licking-the-Seppos capability as a priority.
New Zealand will never, in our lifetime, be able to finance any sort of realistic defense of our shores.
Very dubious about drones launched off a sub – they’d be likely to reveal the location of said sub. Unless we mean undersea drones (aka torpedos).
@MT_Tinman It’s a false narrative that NZ could / can never afford a proper defence force. This country certainly can and has always been able to. However certain politicians, political parties, and Treasury push that narrative in pursuit of their own political ends. Treasury worked for 40 years to have the Air Combat Force canned. In 2000 it pushed for a completely army centric defence force because that was the cheapest option.
People seem to think that drones are the be all to end all, but at present they aren’t and they can be defended against in a variety of ways. It’s the same situation when a new weapon is found and used; a defence against it will be found. In Ukraine the Ukrainians are knocking Russian UAVs out of the sky with missiles, gunfire, and electronic warfare capabilities. WRT the Russian Black Sea Fleet, it’s tied up alongside because of incompetence. No FVEY navy would’ve been caught out like it was, nor humiliated like it was.
Anyone who thinks that the PRC will be easy beats in a war are mistaken. The PLA are well supported, modernised, motivated, and in high morale, unlike the Russian military. However we won’t really know until we face them in combat. I wouldn’t place to much stock on the Indians either. They may participate and again they may not. They are non aligned and have not really forgiven the Americans for arming the Pakistanis.
Im still waiting for someone to tell me why we need Frigates??
As 3 Frigates Mapp explained, 1frigate will be in dry dock getting overhauled, one will be broken down, or about to break down , or used for training, and one will be actually at sea.
Sorry but I see no return on investment, two thirds of its stuck somewhere.
A very beefed maritime airpower air force makes far more sense. Add another 6 Orions, or P8’s, and get involved with drones, they are the coming thing.
This is a far better investment and a far better return on it.
The Yanks, the Japs and the Indians dont wont our single little frigate getting in their way.
Our traditional strength has been our airforce, lets play to it, Kiwis can fly.
Frigates give you a level of persistence that aviation just doesn’t have.
They carry far more punch than any aviation platform.
Short of a B-1B / B-52H no aircraft can carry more than eight anti ship missiles. The F-15EX will be able to carry five possibly six AGM-84 Harpoons.
Frigates can go places and stay there longer than aircraft can. Aircraft can’t sit on station for continuously for three, four, five days, a week etc.; in the middle of the ocean or off a coast without having to return to refuel, rearm, and change crew.
Frigates undertake naval diplomacy which is a valuable tool in any govts diplomatic tool box.
Frigates are capable of undertaking more maritime roles than any aircraft.
Frigates are better VfM (Value for Money) / bang for buck than the squadron of aviation required to fill a similar role.
In both the Australian and NZ context neither country possesses an aircraft capable of the persistence that a frigate has, out at sea.
Defence per se cannot be analysed and account for the same way as a commercial entity because it is not a business. It does not operate on a profit basis. That’s the mistake that many politicians, Treasury, and economists make. It is unusual in how it operates. How would it measure its outputs if it was on a profit basis? Would we count the number of enemy individuals that we killed? Would govt set us a quota of enemy to be killed each year as part of our KPI? What happens if NZDF doesn’t meet its annual quota? Does it go out and shoot a few more? There’s a thing known as the Geneva Convention and it stipulates that the killing of POWs is forbidden and rightly so. NZDF don’t do body counts and never really have. The American Army General Westmoreland made a big deal about body counts of VC and NVA dead. Each night used to see the body count on the TV news.
Drones per se aren’t the be all to end all and for all intents and purposes are only in their infancy. Combat drones more so. There will be counters for them and there is always a signal lag between the control station and them because of the time taken for the signals to travel between the two via satellite links. What do you do when your communications or satellites are knocked out? Drones can’t do astral navigation, humans with sextants, a book of astronomical tables and a good clock can.
We have to deal with what’s available now. Not what maybe in 20 – 50 years. The NZ govt is risk adverse when it comes to defence acquisitions now, so it looks at capabilities and platforms already in service with FVEY partners, not something that is risky developmentally, financially, and temporally (time).