Could an ANZAC solution be the way forward and how could it work?
Op Ed by Ueda Station
The strategic context we are now moving into is not benign and represents significant challenges for New Zealand. The South Pacific is now the soft underbelly of the Indo-Pacific region and the merged air-maritime domain is where we are likely to be increasingly threatened. China has now breached the first island chain with its defence ‘relationship’ with the Solomon Islands and this strategic foothold for Beijing will see it will begin to further engage in the use of sharp power tactics. China will increase the tempo of naval and air tasking deep into the South Pacific and indeed the foothold in Honiara will permit the opportunity for it to disrupt and coerce defence and civilian operations of both New Zealand and Australia from its newly acquired sphere of influence. Over time China will translate this advantage into an Anti-access and Area denial (A2AD) strategy. Simply put, freedom of access into the South Pacific as we know it will simply get much more harder, which will effect – trade, travel, communities, families, resources, the economy – indeed the South Pacific the way it wants to be. It is a modus operandi that is classic Sun Tzu as seen in the South China Sea over the last 15 years.
This is a radical change of circumstances for us in comparison to the context of how we as Kiwi’s saw the Pacific 10 – 20 – 30 years ago, when rational though naive decisions were made to let go of our core defence capabilities that possessed strategic projection and resilient deterrence. We seemingly believed that we did not need them at the time, nor ever would. Our political discourse made a ‘soft power’ approach to defence a more virtuous direction of travel. This introversion by New Zealand has created a strategic vacuum, particularly in our South Pacific front yard. One that is wide open to exploitation from state actors, like China and potentially Russia, who have a completely different set of value judgments concerning the environment, societal cohesion, free markets, human rights, rule of law and the positive role of liberal democracy in bringing about equity and prosperity.
Though our benign strategic environment is now dead, the issue our Defence Force faces, hindered by the Helen Clark era acquisition blunders, is that we are woefully unprepared for the challenges ahead. Furthermore, New Zealand must explicitly understand, as we have failed to do for the last 25 years, that Australia as the regional ‘smart power’ possessing actual combat capabilities – cannot alone do all the heavy lifting on behalf of us in the South Pacific. We as Kiwi’s need to share this responsibility and be proactive about it, because as a nation we could quickly lose favour with Canberra, Washington, Brussels, London, Tokyo, Singapore and other ASEAN nations to our economic detriment. Tokyo learnt the hard way in 1991 during the first Gulf War that being “content to benefit from the efforts of the rest of the international community while avoiding taking direct responsibility” had its costs. (Freedman and Karsh 1993, p121). Democratic Leader of the House Richard Gephardt sent a letter to Prime Minister Kaifu threatening major export restraints on Japanese automobiles into the United States if Japan failed to make what U.S. policy makers deemed to be a sufficient contribution to the war effort. Gephardt’s letter was reiterated by US Secretary of State James Baker and later by US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. In the end the US, UK, the Gulf States and France forced Japan to pay for 20% of the costs of the first Gulf War, some US$22 Billion and Bush 41 then vomited all over the Japanese PM as a thank you. Don’t think for a minute that any of the above Capitals in our wider region will let a laggard New Zealand off lightly if things go pear shape and we prevaricate or want to virtue signal off our own song sheet.
In light of this strategic upheaval the reality is that it is not possible go back 25 years to a 40 aircraft, 3 Squadron, Air Combat Wing anytime soon. To build back an air combat capability at the level as we previously had is too hard, too time consuming and too expensive. Any future Kiwi air combat capability needs to address our existing capability gaps with respect to maritime strike, airborne electronic warfare and tactical airborne reconnaissance. To maximise and future proof the capability any platform will need to also have the fullest possible utility to deal with the spectrum of issues that are coming down the pipeline over the next 20 years. It will need to deal with grey zone disruptors and A2AD tactics. The employment context required is very different from the time of the A-4 Skyhawk. A re-hash of the traditional close air support role of the A-4 Skyhawk with a bit of maritime strike on the side is not what this capability is about in the 21st Century. In fact the cancelled F-16 was going to take the RNZAF air combat capability fully into the 21st century by the time it had been upgraded to Block 50 Falcon Up standard at the end of its 10 Year lease. These future employment contexts for the F-16 were known within air staff planners, but somehow those critics commentating from outside the acquisition team thought that the F-16 capability was simply just a faster A-4.
A modern multi-role air combat platform allows for air power to be distributed across not just the air domain, but also the maritime and land domains to achieve certain kinetic effects or assist another platform, like a P-8A or special forces element, in achieving those kinetic effects. These kinetic effects can be lethal or non-lethal, offensive or defensive in application. Due to their agility and pace within a hostile threat environment air combat assets are cornerstone force enablers to get things done – a flexible, fast way to deliver support at the tactical level, through a multitude of payload packages. The flexibility is such that these can be maritime strike, tactical reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), combat air patrols (CAP), close air support (CAS), interdiction, air security, air superiority, or suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) – all on the single platform. It is not a silo capability but a combat capability that integrates the air domain with the land and maritime domains like no other. Air combat platforms have now become highly versatile and reconfigurable, allowing adaptation to a wide range of roles generating an even greater combat efficacy. Boyd’s loop of Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) is a key part of this cross-domain synergy and an air combat capability is a core determinant in connecting this loop.
It is becoming obvious that we as a country need to do something and fairly quickly, because the strategic context is now very different from when Helen Clark was on the 9th floor of the Beehive. So if rehashing the past approach we took with the former air combat wing is not viable and having no air combat capability is potentially an even worse state of affairs – what do we do now? How do we solve the problem?
The solution to the Kiwi air combat dilemma lies with New Zealand seeking capability integration with the RAAF. The overarching driver to make this happen is the 1991 Closer Defence Relations Agreement (CDR) between New Zealand and Australia, which exists to seek an evolutionary process of examining the practical possibilities of cooperation in aspects of training, doctrine and equipment procurement. Such mutual defence cooperation could be a transitional situation like the current RAF-Qatar Eurofighter/Hawk joint squadron set up, or could be a permanent RNZAF-RAAF joint force operation. Personally, I think a hybrid of the two would work best, where the sustainment, support, training and doctrinal development remains within the RAAF structure, but New Zealand is able to eventually generate an independent Ohakea-based expeditionary sized squadron.
The idea of a integrating our air combat capability within the RAAF force structure is not a new one. Back in 1991 our fellow No Minister contributor Wayne Mapp first suggested the idea in an article he published in the Spring edition of Policy titled Restructuring New Zealand’s Defence Force as one of the future options. Thirty years on as Cold War 1.0 ended and we are now well along the way inside Cold War 2.0 Wayne’s suggestion may have found its time and place.
The RAAF themselves are now taking a whole-of-force approach to airpower application where the capabilities of individual platforms are enhanced by networking across their joint force. This produces sophisticated cooperative engagement effects by linking their distributed sensor platforms with their effector platforms through the sharing of critical mission data and situational awareness to circle the Boyd OODA loop. Their air power strategy focuses on effects, including deterrence, denial, influence, counter-influence, counter-coercion and cost imposition. Through Project Jericho they have begun to arrange this strategy to ensure that their new sophisticated platforms, like the P-8A, MQ-4C, F-35A, KC-30, EA-18G Growler, E-7A, E-55 and F/A-18F all have relevance in the emerging cross-domain grey-zone scenarios and can then provide the Australian government with flexible options. Within that strategic air power context – and there really is no escaping it now whatever wishful conceits some may have here – New Zealand has to find its place in this reality and proactively contribute.
By 2023 the RAAF will fly 72 F-35A, 12 EA-18G Growlers and 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets, across five operational squadrons. They will also retain a residual number of 24 F-35A aircraft pooled in 2 OCU for training and fleet replacement reserve. They have future acquisition options under Phase 7 of Project AIR 6000, (link is to Phase 2A/B) which will consider an additional purchase of 28 further airframes to form a fourth and potentially fifth operational squadron at RAAF Base Amberley, generating a total of around 100 F-35A’s. The F/A-18F Super Hornet is tasked as their main maritime strike platform and is crewed by a Pilot and Air Warfare Operator in the back seat. The fleet of 24 aircraft usually average 4800 hours per annum, which is around 200 annual flying hours per aircraft. Finally the EA-18G Growler, which is an evolved F/A-18F is the main electronic attack platform with an Electronic Warfare Operator in the rear.
In the second part of this commentary I will offer my suggestion as to which of these RAAF aircraft is the platform that would work best for New Zealand in re-establishing an integrated air combat capability with Australia. Affordability is always going to be an issue, and people will ask why not the F-16’s as they are potentially cheaper? In reply I would say that a similar new capability of 12 F-16V Block 70’s, even though it is an absolutely cracker of a strike platform, would see New Zealand spend in the ballpark of twice the cost with respect to real acquisition costs. We would also have to spend a lot more time and money rebuilding such a capability, as we would lack the advantage of partnership integration with the RAAF. Going down that route will take twice as long and twice as much, unless the Singaporeans or Yanks help us big time.
By 2026 according to Treasury’s December 2021 HYEFU New Zealand is going to have a projected GDP of $413.7 Billion and core crown debt of $137.9 Billion, some 30.2% of GDP. Since New Zealand loves to benchmark Scandinavian countries in public policy, if we want to use them as a guide to where they are going with respect to defence spending, Norway and Denmark have set a target of 2% of GDP by 2028 and neutral Sweden and Finland are almost begging to be let into NATO, which also has a 2% target. If we take out the P-8A and C-130J projects New Zealand is still only spending around 1.2% of GDP. The bounce up to 1.4% and 1.5% over the last couple of years is entirely down to these two projects almost running simultaneously, once they’re delivered we will likely drift back to an underwhelming 1.2%, which will not gain influence and keep friends in a deteriorating Indo-Pacific region.
If New Zealand’s defence spending was held above 1.75% of GDP benchmark through the second half of the decade and through the first half of the 2030’s New Zealand would not only be able to afford all of its Future 2035 Defence Plan that came out of the 2015 Defence White Paper, but three or more capable frigates and the joint air combat capability (as Part 2 will detail), plus add an extra P-8A and a couple more C-130J’s above the bare bones minimums we have recently acquired. There are programmes within the United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that could assist New Zealand as it is a NATO+5 nation and under the Biden administration the DSCA is looking to be more creative in assisting countries in the Indo-Pacific region who, are struggling to acquire new capabilities. With the clout of Australia in Washington backing us, we should be able to strike a deal to get a modest, yet effective air combat capability over the line. New Zealand would be helping the Anzac nations get that 7th and vital expeditionary air combat squadron just about the time we and our regional partners will very much need it.
New Zealand is likely to be seriously tested as not just as grey zone threats rise, but as geo-strategic competition ramps up across all relevant domains. Possessing combat capabilities in all of these key domains is becoming increasingly an imperative – especially in the merged air-maritime context of the South Pacific. The continuation of a piecemeal force structure approach that treats an air combat capability as a silo output, one that we can pick and chose to have or not to have is long gone. Time, tactics and technology have marched on – along with the deteriorating strategic environment. New Zealand cannot sit by and do nothing with respect to redeveloping an air combat capability, yet we are hindered by the fact that the cost of attempting to rebuild the previous air combat capability model from 25 years ago is too expensive and too hard to do by ourselves.
In my opinion the practical solution is the development of a squadron sized air combat component integrated within the current RAAF Air Combat Wing structure. This can affordably provide New Zealand what it requires to cover our own direct air power needs, but also deliver a timely and appropriate force enabler to our closest and officially only defence ally – Australia. In Part 2 of this opinion piece I will explain in greater detail how it could work. Nevertheless, a redux of a Kiwi air combat component that is integrated into an RAAF strike wing will send a message to all our regional partners from Washington DC to Singapore, from Tokyo and Canberra, that we are once again serious about playing our part in building genuine deterrence capabilities as our contribution to the regional security architecture during this time of increasing geo-political challenges. That we Kiwi’s are becoming self reliant in partnership again and are going to step up and take responsibility in helping to address the strategic vacuum in the South Pacific with a force for good. That we are moving on from being a fading regional ‘soft power’ and looking towards a future as an emerging ‘smart power’ that, upholds the liberal democratic values, fair and free trade, and the rules based global order.
No Minister 
A very well put together article -looking forward to part 2
Completely out of my realm.. but, could Aussie have an air base here? One of our un(der)used bases.
Is sharing a possibility?
This is a very interesting article, thank you. I look forward to the how and what in the next part. However there’s an essential step before we start naming the kit and that is our foreign policy. Currently it is “independent” which, for many MPs and voters, is a code word for neutrality. To commit a third of our defence budget to being, in essence, a part of the RAAF (and one assumes that the structure of the Navy and Army would be similarly integrated) demands a major shift in our foreign policy. I note that Richard Prebble is arguing for a return to ANZUS which I endorse wholeheartedly, but even the National party is still hovering around the independent/neutral status imposed by the bipartisan non-nuclear policy. First catch your hare, said Mrs Beeton.
Yes it is. Over at the Liberty Scott blog he recently looked at that question, Is New Zealand abandoning independent foreign policy by backing Ukraine?:
I’m not sure even that’s the case with the latter two anymore, as Sweden is now openly talking about joining NATO while Switzerland remains closer to its long-held official position, even as it joins the EU sanctions effort against Russia.
It is hard though to fully reconcile this “independent foreign policy” claim, which is more of a narrative for domestic political consumption, when our FEVY intelligence and free trade ties are deeply interdependent, and yet our defence posture is increasingly becoming dependent on Australia in filling the huge capability gaps in with our current defence posture that we have allowed to emerge. The signing of the Intelligence sharing agreement between New Zealand and Japan this past week, reinforces that in reality, beyond when some halfwit media commentator will pop up and say “we have our independent foreign policy” as it is some great intellectual insight, that interdependence with like minded partners is how we actually survive with respect to making our way in the world.
Udea,
Thanks for this.
To clear up a point on the misunderstanding of Cassandra about the meaning of an independent foreign policy. It does not have the implication of neutrality. New Zealand is part of the west, which I might add is well understood by the current government. Rather it means we decide how we act within the orbit of the west. We don’t automatically do what Australia does. We will have our own approach as to what to do. sometimes it will be the same, other times a bit different.
As for the proposal here, effectively having a squadron of F 35’s within the RAAF, yes it could be done and within a budget of 2% of GDP such a squadron could be afforded along with 3 frigates and two additional P8’s. The real question is whether it is a sufficient priority that would use nearly 20% of the defence budget.
Essentially the cost choice is between one squadron of F35’s or an additional frigate, in this instance a fourth frigate. That is assuming there is the political will to lift defence spending to 2% of GDP. I would note that getting a squadron of F35’s could be done way faster than getting a frigate. Probably only three years from placing an order to actually getting the aircraft.
As for priorities, I would certainly rate three frigates above one squadron of F35’s and two frigates.
So the issue is twofold. Are we prepared to go to 2% as opposed to 1.75% (the defence budget with 3 frigates) and is a squadron of F35’s more important than four frigates.
Wayne: my “misunderstanding” is shared by lots of Labour MPs, the Greens, academics and voters galore. I suspect even some in the left part of the National party. It’s fact which can’t be wished away. Of course it’s wrong. An independent foreign policy would weigh up every issue and then make a decision based on national interest, but you can’t deny a sector of the NZ community which doesn’t want a bar of any argument qv Robert Jackson’s column this morning. You’ll recall such a policy was a feature of the NZ Party which cost your party office. Costa Rica was given as the example for NZ to follow. For lots of people “independent foreign policy” means neutrality.
On thinking about this further, particularly the cost, I don’t think a F 35 squadron could be purchased and sustained for 0.25% of GDP, as I previously implied. 0.25% of GDP (see GDP figures below) would be around $875 million per year.
F35 aircraft cost about $200 million each, so a squadron of 12 aircraft would cost $2.4 billion, but that does not take account spare parts, training packages, etc. Being integrated into the RAAF system would reduce these latter costs, but the acquisition cost would still be at least $3 billion. The direct annual operating cost of the aircraft, including the cost of squadron personnel, would be at least $500 million. This does not include cost of capital or the cost of basing. These would add a good deal more than $500 million per year. All up the cost of a F35 squadron, even within the existing RAAF system, could be up to $1.5 billion per year.
It is worth noting that the New Zealand GDP is $350 billion, so 2% of GDP for defence provides $7 billion per year. At $1.5 billion, a F35 squadron would use 20% of the defence budget of 2% of GDP. In contrast a frigate has an annual cost of around $500 to 600 million, including cost of capital. Basically a third to half the annual cost of a F35 squadron.
When looking at all these costs, a defence force with three frigates and a F35 squadron is going to cost more than 2% of GDP, probably 2.2% of GDP. To put this in perspective, three frigates cost $1.8 billion per year and a F35 squadron costs another $1.5 billion, being a total of $3.3 billion. In contrast four frigates would have an annual cost of up to $2.4 billion. In short, four frigates compared to three frigates and a F35 squadron costs nearly $1 billion less per year.
It is going to be a significant challenge to convince the Wellington public service establishment (Treasury) that we should get three frigates, much less four frigates, or a F35 squadron. However, in light of changed circumstances, I think it will be possible to get three frigates, as opposed to the two we got in the 1980’s/1990’s. Clearly we are in a more competitive environment now. Our partners, particularly Australia, will expect us to step up, at least to some extent.
I note I have not dealt with the strategic advantages of an additional F 35 squadron as opposed to one or two additional frigates. To put this into perspective, one additional F35 squadron will add around 12% additional capability, assuming Australia ultimately goes to 100 F 35. One extra Type 31 frigate will add around 8% more capability, assuming Australia has eight Type 26 and New Zealand has two Type 31, frigates. Two is more like 16%. Maybe slightly less depending on the fit out of the two classes of frigates. Lets say the two additional frigates and one extra F 35 squadron add more or less the same additional percentage of capability to their respective fleets.
Which matters the most? More additional air combat capability, or more naval combat capability?
I won’t analyse that question immediately. Another comment, I think. However, my initial sense is that it is additional naval capability. Particularly given that each additional frigate has a much lower cost than an additional air combat squadron.
I think you’ll be pleased then with what you see in Part 2.
Wayne just for your reference to assist in getting your figures tightened up. It is costing AU$328 million p.a under Output Class CAF30 in the Australian Department of Defence 2022-2023 Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) to generate and sustain the F-35A Lightning II capability, currently of 48 aircraft based at RAAF Base Williamtown NSW, and RAAF Base Tindal, NT which delivered around 8700 operational hours.
AIR 6000 Phase 2A/B, which is the acquisition side of the F-35A programme has had an average Gross Weapon System acquisition price of AU$115 million. A number of these aircraft were bought and delivered when the F-35A was still in low rate production.
That should read AUD$145m per Gross Weapon System for the cost of the F-35A.
Interesting article, I guess you have to layout what sort of war we will be fighting in 5 -25 years time.
That vision has to be clear, and it involves some hard decisions.
For a country the size of NZ having a traditional Navy, and an airforce is simply not possible or affordable, in my view.
A lot of the frigate based stuff can be done by an arm of the enhanced airforce, Orions, Growlers etc.
Integrating our airforce, strike arm, with Australia makes sense, especially if 2nd hand Hornets are an option.
The airforce offers the best bang for the buck, and long reach, whether off our shores or off Australian shores.
Besides we would not have a recruitment and retention problem with the airforce. We have ready recruits in time of conflict with many aero clubs scattered around the country as feeders to the airforce, Its seen as exciting, techie and a way into a future career.
In the last Pacific war it was our airforce flying Corsairs and Kittyhawks that made the main contribution.
We have to play to our strengths , and airforce is something we do well, with our limited resources.
Im not dissing the Navy or the Army, or their contribution to our history!
In todays ocean warfare the USA would take care of our needs. Our Navy need to have essentially a non strike role, logistics ships, hospital ships civil emergency response here or in the islands. Recently we have seen the absurd situation of a frigate toddling off to Tonga to sit there and produce fresh water. If that emergency had been worse what else could they have done, very little I expect.
I look forward to Part 2
I look forward to Part 2
Heh. I should have said what time it would be published because this comment probably belongs there rather than here, especially given your comment about the Super Hornets.
I reckon you should just re-post this comment on the Part 2 post.
Hi Tom,
If you want to move it thats fine with me 🙂
[TH: While I can edit and delete I can’t move a comment to another post. So you’ll have to if you think it’s worth the effort. 🙂 ]
Not a bad article and it does have a good base to work from. Your basic premise that the government can afford to fund defence more each year is spot on. At present about $7 billion per year for NZDF and MOD would be sufficient to start with. There would also have to be capital injections to recover lost capabilities and introduce new ones to ensure that NZDF is capable of operating and surviving in a modern near peer conflict. The current Russian – Ukraine War is a good example of modern near peer conflict.
The next point is whilst many governments are still hooked to the idea of funding defence as a % GDP, that is seen as an aspiration or a goal rather than what the defence forces actually require, so leads to problems such as we see with NZDF. The NATO requirement for members to fund their defence forces by 2% GDP per annum is seen by sum members as an aspiration, e.g., Canada & Germany, rather than a requirement. But in Germany’s defence it is a special case because it is the strongest economy in Europe and prior to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, if it had funded the Bundeswehr at 2% GDP it would have had the largest military in Europe and that would’ve created a lot of disquiet because of German history.
The trend is now to move away from the 2% GDP funding and to fund defence forces what they actually require. We are seeing this in Australia now with its latest defence funding; the Hunter Class FFG program, SSN program, Collins Class SSK LEP program, Boxer CRV program, IFV program, 155mm SPG acquisition program, JORN upgrade program etc. It is something that we have to do here now as well as exempting Defence from Treasury’s Capital Charge, which costs Defence a fortune.
The important point about the Realm of New Zealand is that it’s a maritime realm that extends from Antarctica to New Zealand, Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. Further to that our Area Maritime Of Interest (AOMI) extends to the Equator and half way between here and South America. Hence we require a good sized navy and air force to monitor and act in our interests within the AOMI. We also have responsibility for the defence of Samoa and Tonga. Next are our Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC) along which all of our seaborne trade travels. 99.5% of our trade is carried by sea and a significant amount of that transits through South East Asia and North East Asia. We are dependent upon our SLOC for fuel, medicines, electronics, clothes, food, building materials, vehicles etc., and the current logistics problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate just how reliant we are on international shipping. That’s our Achilles heel.
First we actually to determine what we want a future Air Combat Force (ACF) to do, and a CAS role isn’t one of them. If the Army wants CAS then they can request armed combat helicopters. I would argue that it has to be maritime strike and anything else is secondary. Whatever platform chosen has to have a large combat radius of at least 1,000 nautical miles without refuelling and ability to carry four AGM-158C LRASM that far without the need to refuel. We should fund a minimum of 28 of these because there will be loses in training and combat. 36 would be better. Yes it’s expensive but in the long run it’s better like an insurance policy. NZ governments and Treasury have a habit of buying to few and then thrashing the platforms having to replace them far sooner and after the life cycle costs have skyrocketed for the ones they have initially bought. The government’s initial cheapness has backfired and turned into a massive cost expenditure. They never learn and the cycle repeats itself.
Two more P-8A would be ideal and some MQ-9B SeaGuardian MALE UAV for persistence maritime surveillance. They appear to be sold in blocks of four aircraft with one fixed control unit and one mobile control unit. Quantity always has a quality of it’s own when we are talking about capability numbers as low as what NZ generally deals in. Something that I think that should be looked at is using CubeSat based oceanic surveillance and defence communications systems that can be easily and quickly replaced. We have the capability to design, manufacture, and launch such satellites here in NZ.
I look forward with much interest to your second instalment.